> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://phalanetwork.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Terms / Glossary

> An authoritative reference for every core concept, component, and cryptographic primitive that powers the dstack confidential-computing platform.

> This glossary defines key dstack terms—what they mean, why they matter, and how they're used—organised A-Z with **bold terms**, *italic highlights*, and helpful links.

***

## A – C

### **ACME (Automatic Certificate Management Environment)**

Open IETF protocol ([RFC 8555](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555)) that lets software request, renew, and revoke TLS certificates without human intervention.\
*In dstack*: **dstack-gateway** calls *Certbot* in the DNS-01 flow so you can obtain a valid certificate even when ports 80/443 are fire-walled, guaranteeing "zero-touch" HTTPS for every app.

### **ACME DNS-01 Challenge**

Flow in which domain control is proven by publishing a TXT record under `_acme-challenge.<domain>`.\
*In dstack*: used at first boot; the gateway automation injects the TXT record via your DNS provider's API, then cleans it up after issuance.

### **App-id**

Unique identifier for deployed applications in dstack, typically derived from the application's cryptographic hash.\
*In dstack*: used for routing (`<app-id>.domain.com`), key derivation, and authorization checks with smart contracts.

### **AppAuth**

Ethereum smart-contract that stores the *allowed container-image hash* for a given application and signals the gateway that a CVM may expose traffic once its **Attestation Quote** matches that hash.\
*In dstack*: every new deployment registers its image digest with AppAuth; the gateway consults this contract before adding a route.\
Further reading: [Smart-contract basics](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/smart-contracts/) • [dstack component map (GitHub)](https://github.com/Dstack-TEE/dstack#architecture).

### **Attestation Quote**

Signed report produced by a TEE (e.g. Intel TDX) that hashes each boot component (`RTMR0-3`) and binds them to a verifier-supplied nonce.\
*In dstack*: **dstack-guest-agent** forwards the quote to **dstack-kms**; keys flow only when the measurements match the on-chain allow-list.

### **Blockchain & Smart Contracts**

Deterministic programs (e.g. **KmsAuth**, **AppAuth**) stored on a public chain. They record trusted hashes and decide whether a node, image, or user may receive keys.\
*In dstack*: provide decentralised governance and an immutable audit trail—removing single points of failure typical in classical PKI.

### **CAA Records (Certification Authority Authorization)**

DNS records that specify which certificate authorities are allowed to issue certificates for a domain.\
*In dstack*: automatically managed by the gateway to restrict certificate issuance and prevent unauthorized certificates.

### **Certificate Transparency (CT)**

Public log system ([RFC 6962](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962)) for every certificate issued by participating CAs.\
*In dstack*: the gateway subscribes to CT feeds and automatically revokes or alerts on rogue certs for your domains.

### **Certbot**

EFF-maintained ACME client that automates Let's Encrypt operations.\
*In dstack*: shipped inside the gateway image; runs on a timer to renew certs \~30 days before expiry without downtime.

### **CID (Container ID)**

Unique identifier for QEMU virtual machines in dstack, managed by the VMM's allocation pool.\
*In dstack*: prevents conflicts between VMs; configured via `cid_start` and `cid_pool_size` in VMM settings.

### **Compose-hash**

Cryptographic hash of the `docker-compose.yml` file content used for application verification.\
*In dstack*: measured into RTMR registers and validated against blockchain records for secure deployments.

### **Confidential Virtual Machine (CVM)**

VM backed by a hardware TEE (Intel TDX today) providing automatic memory encryption and verifiable launch measurements.\
*In dstack*: every user workload lives in a CVM so that the cloud operator, host OS, and hypervisor cannot read or tamper with data in use.

### **Container Runtime**

Minimal OCI runtime (*runc* / *crun*) inside the CVM image.\
*In dstack*: obtains secrets through the guest-agent's Unix socket rather than env-vars, reducing the attack surface for in-container code.

***

## D – F

### **DCAP (Data-Center Attestation Primitives)**

Intel open-source libraries for local verification of SGX / TDX quotes.\
*In dstack*: bundled with KMS to avoid external Intel Attestation Service dependencies.\
[GitHub](https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives)

### **Device-id**

Hardware-specific identifier used in attestation and authorization processes.\
*In dstack*: helps ensure deployments run only on authorized hardware and prevents unauthorized migration.

### **DNS TXT Record Lookup**

Method for service discovery using DNS text records with the `_dstack-app-address` prefix.\
*In dstack*: enables custom domain routing by publishing application endpoints in DNS records.

### **Docker Compose**

YAML file describing a multi-container app.\
*In dstack*: your unchanged Compose file is parsed by the VMM; each service is mapped to a secure network endpoint.

### **dstack CLI**

Command-line interface for deploying and managing applications in dstack.\
*In dstack*: primary user interface for `deploy`, `list`, `stop` operations and application lifecycle management.

### **dstack-gateway**

Security-aware reverse proxy: performs WireGuard ingress, RA-TLS validation, automatic certificate management, and CT monitoring.\
*Role*: single public entry-point for all CVMs.

### **dstack-guest-agent**

Small Rust daemon inside every CVM. Exposes RPC for `get_quote`, `get_key`, and `start_container`.\
*Role*: sole entity allowed to unseal keys, ensuring secrets never leave the encrypted memory domain.

### **dstack-kms (Key Management Service)**

CVM-resident service that uses **DCAP** to verify quotes, then deterministically derives per-app keys (disk, TLS, JWT) from a master seed.\
*Role*: dstack's root of cryptographic trust.

### **dstack-os**

Minimal, security-hardened Linux image (\~40 MiB) built by **meta-dstack**, stripping out shells, compilers, and package managers to shrink the attack surface.\
*Benefit*: identical runtime across TEE hardware and faster boot times.\
Further reading: [Phala blog](https://phala.network/posts/Dstack-A-Zero-Trust-Framework-for-Confidential-Containers) • [meta-dstack layer](https://github.com/Dstack-TEE/dstack/tree/main/meta-dstack).

### **dstack-util**

Comprehensive command-line utility providing TDX attestation, system initialization, cryptographic services, and container management.\
*In dstack*: handles full disk encryption setup, RTMR extensions, certificate generation, and system bootstrapping within CVMs.

### **dstack-vmm (Virtual Machine Manager)**

Rust supervisor on the host that spawns, monitors, and tears down CVMs via QEMU + TDX, and presents a REST/GUI that accepts your `docker-compose.yaml`.\
*Role*: bridges DevOps tooling to hardware TEE features.

### **FDE (Full-Disk Encryption)**

Block-level encryption via Linux *dm-crypt/LUKS*.\
*In dstack*: `dstack-util setup` seals the volume key so disks remain unreadable until the CVM passes attestation.

***

## G – M

### **Gateway Agent**

Service component within the gateway that handles communication with CVMs and manages WireGuard connections.\
*In dstack*: configured on port 8090 by default and manages the VPN tunnel establishment.

### **Guest Agent Socket (`/var/run/dstack.sock`)**

Unix socket through which containers request keys or quotes.\
*Guarantee*: secrets bypass the filesystem and environment variables, minimising leakage.

### **Guest API**

VMM endpoint (`/guest`) that provides proxied access to CVM guest agents.\
*In dstack*: enables secure communication between host components and applications running inside CVMs.

### **Hardware Random Number Generator (RNG)**

On-die entropy source conforming to NIST SP 800-90.\
*In dstack*: feeds all cryptographic operations inside the TEE; host RNGs are used only as a secondary pool.

### **Host API**

VMM endpoint (`/api`) for CVM notifications and host information exchange.\
*In dstack*: handles communication between the host system and running CVMs for management operations.

### **Instance-id**

Unique identifier for specific CVM instances within an application deployment.\
*In dstack*: used for tracking individual VM instances and managing their lifecycle and resources.

### **Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)**

CPU feature set providing encrypted VM memory, DMA isolation, and a new attestation leaf.\
*In dstack*: exclusive hardware backend for CVMs (AMD SEV-SNP & ARM CCA on the roadmap). See [Intel TDX specification](https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html).

### **iohash / RTMR Measurement**

SHA-384 hash stored in TDX Runtime Measurement Registers.\
*In dstack*: compared against the allow-list in **KmsAuth** before keys are released.

### **KmsAuth**

Smart-contract that keeps an *allow-list of trusted RTMR hashes* and authorises **dstack-kms** to release keys only when a presented quote matches one of those hashes.\
*In dstack*: policy gate for every key-release request.\
Further reading: [Ethereum smart-contract docs](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/smart-contracts/) • [dstack README](https://github.com/Dstack-TEE/dstack#readme).

### **LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup)**

Standard on-disk format for FDE keys; supports multiple keyslots and PBKDF2/Argon2 hardening.\
*In dstack*: initialises NVMe drives attached to CVMs using AES-XTS-Plain64 cipher.

### **meta-dstack**

Yocto meta-layer that builds the dstack-os image with only the guest-agent, container runtime, and attestation libs.\
*Benefit*: smaller footprint and reproducible builds.

### **MRTD (Measurement of Runtime TDX Data)**

CPU register that records a SHA-384 hash of the *static* TD state (e.g. firmware) at build time—complements dynamic `RTMR0-3`.\
*In dstack*: **dstack-kms** and **KmsAuth** validate MRTD inside each quote.\
See [kernel.org TDX docs](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/next/x86/tdx.html).

***

## N – R

### **Nonce (Attestation)**

Verifier-supplied random value inside the quote to guarantee freshness and stop replay attacks.\
*In dstack*: the VMM generates a 256-bit nonce for every attestation request.

### **OCI (Open Container Initiative)**

Industry standard for container formats and runtimes.\
*In dstack*: ensures compatibility with standard Docker containers while adding TEE security layers.

### **Phala Cloud**

Managed service that runs dstack on bare-metal TDX clusters, providing click-to-deploy CVMs, automatic upgrades, and usage-based billing—ideal for teams that want confidential computing without operating hardware.\
Further reading: [Phala docs](https://docs.phala.network/overview/phala-network/dstack) • [dstack architecture blog](https://phala.network/posts/Dstack-A-Zero-Trust-Framework-for-Confidential-Containers)

### **QEMU**

Open-source machine emulator and virtualizer used by dstack-vmm to create and manage CVMs.\
*In dstack*: provides the foundation for running CVMs with TDX support and hardware isolation.

### **RA-TLS (Remote-Attestation TLS)**

Technique ([arXiv 1801.05863](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05863.pdf)) of embedding a quote in an X.509 extension so the TLS handshake authenticates enclave state.\
*In dstack*: the gateway proxies traffic only after validating this extension.

### **ra-rpc**

Wrapper around pRPC that tunnels every request through RA-TLS, giving internal API calls the same attestation guarantees as HTTPS.\
*In dstack*: used by control-plane traffic (VMM ↔ KMS ↔ Guest Agent).

### **Remote Attestation**

Two-party protocol where a quote is generated and verified (using DCAP certs & CRLs).\
*In dstack*: prerequisite for key release, network exposure, and service registration.

### **Resource Allocation**

Policy-driven distribution of CPU, RAM, and network to CVMs—enforced by cgroups and tc filters.\
*Goal*: prevent noisy-neighbour issues while upholding TEE guarantees.

### **RPC API**

VMM endpoint (`/prpc`) for VM lifecycle management and operations using Protocol Buffers.\
*In dstack*: primary interface for programmatic control of CVM deployment and management.

### **RTMR (Runtime Measurement Registers)**

TDX hardware registers (RTMR0-3) that store cryptographic measurements of system state and boot process.\
*In dstack*: extended with application events and verified against blockchain allow-lists for security.

***

## S – Z

### **Secure Ingress**

Layered design: WireGuard tunnel → RA-TLS termination → service routing.\
*Outcome*: traffic is encrypted on the WAN and remains cryptographically bound to the attested CVM on the LAN.

### **SGX Sealing**

Intel SGX feature for encrypting data with hardware-derived keys that persist across reboots.\
*In dstack*: used in Local-Key-Provider mode for persistent key storage without external KMS dependency.

### **Supervisor**

Process management component that handles CVM lifecycle operations and resource monitoring.\
*In dstack*: integrates with VMM to ensure reliable CVM startup, monitoring, and cleanup operations.

### **TDX Module Specification**

Official Intel document detailing TDX semantics—recommended starting point for low-level implementers.

### **tdx-attest**

Rust crate that talks to the TDX module to fetch quotes, extend RTMRs, and bundle them into RA-TLS certificates.\
*In dstack*: compiled into the guest-agent so every CVM can self-serve attestation material.\
GitHub: [tdx-attestation-sdk](https://github.com/automata-network/tdx-attestation-sdk)

### **TLS Passthrough**

Gateway routing mode where TLS termination is handled by the application rather than the gateway.\
*In dstack*: enabled by appending 's' to domain names (`<app-id>s.domain.com`) for end-to-end encryption.

### **TLS Termination**

Gateway mode where HTTPS connections are decrypted at the gateway and forwarded as HTTP to applications.\
*In dstack*: default mode for `<app-id>.domain.com` routing with automatic certificate management.

### **Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)**

Hardware-enforced enclave yielding confidentiality and integrity even against a malicious OS.\
*In dstack*: foundational primitive—everything else is orchestration.\
See [GlobalPlatform TEE architecture](https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-systems-architecture/).

### **Web UI**

VMM endpoint (`/`) providing HTML console for browser-based management of CVMs and applications.\
*In dstack*: accessible at `http://localhost:9080` for deployment monitoring and log viewing.

### **WireGuard**

Modern VPN protocol using Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305.\
*In dstack*: links gateway replicas into an authenticated mesh and protects east-west traffic.\
Whitepaper: [WireGuard paper](https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf)

### **X25519**

Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol using Curve25519.\
*In dstack*: used for cryptographic key derivation and secure communication establishment.

### **Zero Trust TLS**

Security model where every connection is authenticated and encrypted regardless of network location.\
*In dstack*: implemented through RA-TLS to ensure all communications are cryptographically bound to attested CVM state.

### **Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)**

Cryptographic proof that reveals nothing except validity—enabling privacy-preserving audits.\
*Future use*: optional layer for apps that must prove correct execution off-chain.

### **ZFS**

Advanced file system providing data integrity, snapshots, and encryption features.\
*In dstack*: used with Blake3 checksums and encryption for secure data storage within CVMs.

***

## 📑 Reference Index

| Spec / Paper / Repo        | Description                                         |
| -------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| RFC 8555                   | Automatic Certificate Management Environment        |
| RFC 6962                   | Certificate Transparency                            |
| Intel DCAP repo            | github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives |
| WireGuard Whitepaper       | wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf                  |
| Intel TDX Spec             | intel.com → Trust Domain Extensions                 |
| arXiv 1801.05863           | Integrating SGX Remote Attestation with TLS         |
| LUKS FAQ                   | cryptsetup wiki                                     |
| GlobalPlatform TEE SysArch | globalplatform.org specs                            |
| OCI Runtime Spec           | opencontainers.org/about/overview/                  |
| dstack GitHub              | github.com/Dstack-TEE/dstack                        |
| Phala Network              | phala.network                                       |
